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In t:he Supreme Court: 
of the State of Utah 
E. S. WILSON, 
Plaintiff, Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant. 
vs. 
WEBER COUNTY, a public corporation 
of the State of Utah, 
Defendant, Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent. 
APPELLAJ.~T'S REPLY BRIEF 
No. 6195 
The questions involved as set out in the cross-appellant's 
brief are: 
1. Does respondent's complaint state facts suffi-
cient in its "first cause of action," to constitute a cause 
of action against appellant? 
(a) Is an allegation of payment of the moneys 
under protest necessary to complete a full allegation 
of said cause of action? 
(b) Is it necessary to allege the presentation and 
rejection of a claim against Weber County pursuant to 
the provisions of Section 19-11-10, R. S. U. 1933? 
2. Are respondent's second and third causes of 
action on their face barred by the provisions of Sec-
tion 104-2-30 R. S. U. 1933? 
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(a) When does the period of limitation begin to 
run on respondent's causes of action? 
( 1) Is prior demand a necessary part of re-
spondent's cause of action? 
( 2) If prior demand is a prerequisite to action, 
may a claimant indefinitely delay making demand? 
( 3) If the claimant may not indefinitely postpone 
the running of the statute by delaying demand, when 
will the period begin to run in the absence of a de-
mand? 
ARGUMENT 
The appellant of this brief will not make an extended 
discussion of the first question as we consider that our brief 
on the appeal covered that. 
As to the second and third causes of action involved, in 
Question 2, Subdivisions thereof, it may be assumed for the 
purpose of argument only that in these two causes of action 
the first question is not involved as we are particularly anxious 
to have a definite ruling as to both points of law, and that the 
consideration of them separately insures the separate rulings. 
In order to have it definitely before the minds of the 
Court the complaint alleges that the payments were made to 
the Clerk of Said Court as follows: 
Estate Date of Payment 
Maule's Estate __________________________________________________________ July 1, 1935 
Scowcroft's Estate ______________________________________________ August 2 7, 1931 
Steven's Estate. _________________________________________________________ April 4, 1933 
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It is alleged demands were made as follows; and the 
record discloses suit was filed in this Court to recover these 
sums from Weber County as aforesaid on April 4, 1939. 
Estate Date of Demand Date Suit Filed Amount 
$325.00 
967.00 
65.00 
Maule's Estate ________ Sept. 1, 1938 
Scowcroft's Estate .. Sept. 1, 1938 
Steven's Estate ______ :l\Iar. 6, 1939 
April 4, 1939 
April 4, 1939 
April4, 1939 
It will, therefore, be noticed that the substantial elapsed 
time between the date of payment and the date of demand in 
each estate is as follows: 
Estate Elapsed Time 
Maule's Estate __________________________________________________ 3 years, 2 months 
Scowcroft's Estate ________________________________________________ 7 years, 4 days 
Steven's Estate __________________________________ s years, 11 months, 2 days 
And the substantial lapse of time between date of pay-
ment and date of suit filed is as follows: 
Estate Flapsed Time 
Maule's Estate ____________________________________ 3 years, 9 months, 3 days 
Scowcroft's Estate ______________________________ 7 years, 7 months, 7 days 
Steven's Estate ____________________________________________________________________ 6 years 
To the second and third causes of action the District 
Court ruled that a demand was not the basis of the cause of 
action but was merely a step in the administrative procedure 
that must be taken within the statutory period of four years. 
\Ve quote from the Memorandum Decision of the District 
Court as it sets forth the argument in a very learned and 
forcible manner: 
* * * "The Statute held applicable to the facts in the San 
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Pete County case, which this Court must find is applicable 
to the facts in this case is as follows: 
"Deductions and Refunds. The board of County Com-
missioners, upon sufficient evidence being produced 
that the property has been erroneously or illegally 
assessed, may order the county treasurer to allow the 
taxes on that part of the property erroneously or il-
legally assessed to be deducted before payment of 
taxes. Any taxes, interest and costs paid more than 
once, or erroneously or illegally collected, may, by 
order of the board of county commissioners, be re-
funded by the county treasurer, and the portion of such 
taxes, interest and costs, paid to the state or any taxing 
unit, must be refunded to the county, and the proper 
officer must draw his warrant therefor in favor of the 
county." 
But, from reading the San Pete County case it appears to 
the Court that the defendant, in the San Pete County case, 
urged that the theory of the plaintiff's action was a "demand 
under protest" based on the insufficient allegation of the com-
plaint, reading: "but that said payment was not voluntarily 
made." (Pg. 563) 
And, the Court says: 
Pg. 567. "* * * While it is alleged in the complaint 
that the taxes in question were 'not voluntarily' paid, 
yet is it clear from the facts that they were not paid 
under protest as provided by Section 2684." 
The purpose of this contention by the defendant, in the 
San Pete County case, as it appears to the Court, was to bring 
the payment under the general rule as announced under "Tax-
ation" in 26 R. C. L. pg. 455, Para. 411, and referred to in 
many citations submitted by counsel in this case, as follows, 
namely: 
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"In accordance with the general rule governing volun-
tary payments, a person who voluntarily pays an il-
legal tax, even though he pays it under considerable 
actual pressure, cannot maintain an action to recover 
it back." 
We do not, at this time, refer to the cited cases based on 
this principle because in such cases the rule is applied to stat-
utes peculiar to the state from which the citation comes, which 
may introduce complications to a clear understanding of this 
case, as no case cited appears to be under a statute the same 
as above in which the county can secure a refund as this stat-
ute contemplates, which, as, it will be later developed, must 
be considered. 
At this point the case before the Court presents two 
questions: 
( 1) Is a demand on the county commissioners a 
necessary act giving rise to the cause of action against 
a county under Section 80-10-17, Revised Statutes of 
1933? 
( 2) \Vhen does the statute of limitations begin to 
run, from the performance of such act, or from the 
date of payment of the illegal tax? 
No doubt the answer to either of these cases will solve 
the other. 
In the San Pete County case the Court's opinion of a four 
year statute of limitations is based on the holding in the case 
of Mining Co. v. Juab County, 22 Utah 403. 
In the San Pete County case the taxes were paid October 
22, 1907, and suit filed to recover on February 27, 1911, which 
was approximately three years, four months and five days after 
payment, and, then the Court says: 
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Pg. 574. "* * *Whether under section 2642 the action 
must be commenced within four years from the date 
the tax is paid or within four years from the date of 
the demand we do not decide, because this question is 
not raised nor necessary to the decision of this case." 
Apparently a close reading will not reveal a demand in the 
San Pete County case. In this case the Court speaks of a 
"demand" and uses this language: 
Pg. 5 72. "* * * But we need not go, nor do we go to 
the extent of holding in this case that taxes con{ing 
within the purview of section 2642 may be recovered 
back without first making a demand therefor upon the 
county commissioners. We think that the statute im-
plies such a demand from the fact that it authorizes 
the board of commissioners to order the refunding of 
the taxes. But we think that it is likewise implied that 
the statute does not require more than a demand after 
payment, since it is there clearly implied that the order 
to refund may be made after the taxes have been ap-
portioned among the several departments of state en-
titled thereto, and hence provides that such depart-
ments must, in turn, refund to the county their pro-
portion. It is clearly contemplated, therefore, that no 
protest is necessary, since it is assumed that the refund 
is not ordered until after apportionment has been 
made." 
Because some of the cases treat "claims," "demand" and 
"protest" as synonymous, it is difficult to keep in mind that 
"claim," "demand" and "protest" are different words and have 
different meanings. Each being applicable to a particular 
statutory regulation. 
The word "claim,' is used in Section 19-10-10, Revised 
Statutes of Utah 1933. 
The word "demand" is construed into the Statute by the 
Court in the San Pete County case. 
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The word "protest" is used in Section 19-10-11, Revised 
Statutes of Utah 1933. 
The Court, in the San Pete County case, discussed Sec-
tion 2684 Laws of Utah 1907, now 80-11-11, Revised Statutes 
1933, and held that under Section 2642, Laws of 1907, now 
80-10-17, Revised Statutes of 1933 that no "protest" was nec-
essary, and, as stated before, held that Sections 511, 531 and 
533 of the 1907 Statutes, now 19-5-23, and 19-11-10 and 19-
11-11, Revised Statutes of 1933 which had to do with "claims" 
were not applicable to the question presented to the Court. 
And we find in 14 American Jurisprudence, Title "Coun-
ties," Page 228, Par. 65 that: 
The word "claim" as ordinarily used in the Statute im-
parts a matter of charge which is based upon some statute or 
grows out of the performance of some authorized contract. 
But the Court in the San Pete County case introduces the 
word "Demand" and says that Section 2642 of the Laws of 
1907, now 80-10-17, as follows: 
Pg. 572. ':* * * 'Ve think that the statute implies 
(such) a demand from the fact that it authorized the 
board of commissioners to arder the refunding of the 
tax." 
Assuming the statute does so imply a demand. Is such 
demand the act giving rise to the cause of action? If so, no 
demand appears to have been made in the San Pete County 
case. 
So the Court in that case did not by example construe a 
demand as either a condition precedent or the act giving rise 
to the action. 
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Consider these illustrations: 
ILLUSTRATION I. 
In the case of Roxana Petroleum Corp'n v. Bollinger, 54 
Fed. Rp. (2nd) pg. 296, it was held: 
"Tax payment cannot be recovered if tax paid volun-
tarily without protest, because the tax might at once 
be paid into the State Treasury, and that the State 
could not, without its consent be sued to recover the 
tax, and that the director of finance would, of course, 
not have the money available unless it could be re-
covered from the sources through which it had been 
disbursed." 
This situation could not arise under Section 80-10-17, 
Revised Statutes of 1933. Therefore, there is no necessity for 
a demand either as a condition precedent, or as the act giving 
rise to the cause of action. 
ILLUSTRATION II. 
In the case of First Nat. Bank of Scottsboro v. Jackson 
County, 150 Southern, Pg. 690; in commenting upon the tax 
set forth in 61 Corpus Juris 1001, and 26 Ruling Case Law 
454, the Court states: 
"There the taxes were paid to the coliector, under pro-
test, and with written notice that suit would immedi-
ately be instituted for its recovery, which was presum-
ably done before any distribution was made." 
One of the theories of the demand, claim or protest, is to 
protect the tax collecting authority before apportionment and 
distribution of the tax money, which, under the laws of some 
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States, cannot be readily recovered, or is actually impossible 
to recover after a certain time. But such condition does not 
exist in Utah, and, therefore, the necessity for a demand as 
a condition precedent does not exist, and hence the demand 
does not give rise to a cause of action under Section 80-10-17 
Revised Statutes of 1933. 
Compilations may be made showing why a "condition 
precedent" exists in other jurisdictions, which the illustrations 
above reflect; including the class of cases holding: 
"Tax payment can not be recovered if the taxpayer 
paid the tax voluntarily without intention to question 
or resist the tax to recover it back." 
But, in Utah, where a tax is erroneously or illegally col-
lected by a county, under the statute upon which plaintiff's 
action is predicated, that portion of the tax apportioned among 
the several departments of the State may be refunded to the 
county upon the proper officer drawing his warrant therefor 
in favor of the county. 
Another theory for the presentation of a demand, claim 
or payment under protest is founded upon the propriety of 
giving the county notice of the claim and an opportunity to 
pay it without suit. It is designed to protect the board from 
importunities of passing on claims before they are presented 
in such a way as to be considered intelligent; and to enable 
the board to guard against improper charges, and to secure 
the taxpayers against abuses in the allowance of claims. 
The requirements of the law in this respect range from 
the presentation of a demand by a mere written statement or 
account giving the nature of the claim and identifying it so as 
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to bar another action to the presentation, and filing, of a 
formal and authenticated or verified statement. 
We do not doubt that the legislature may prescribe con-
ditions under which a County may be sued. But to hold the 
Statute under which this action is brought implies a "demand," 
and then to go further and construe that statute so as to make 
it a condition under which the County may be sued would in 
the opinion of this Court be an unwarranted and improper 
construction. 
If a demand is necessary to give rise to a cause of action, 
there must be some good reason for the making of such de-
mand, and while a demand under the Utah Statute may be 
implied, as the Court says in the case of Nelson v. San Pete 
County that holding does not imply that such demand is a 
necessary act giving rise to a cause of action, but rather is a 
demand, as pointed out in the San Pete County case by the 
Court, based upon the theory that the law authorizes the 
county commissioners to order the refund of the taxes, and 
is, therefore; founded upon the propriety of giving the county 
commissioners notice of the claim and an opportunity to pay 
without suit. No person desires to sue, if payment could be 
effected on a demand. * * * 
* * * Particular reference is made to the text in 3 7 Corpus 
Juris, Page 955, under the title "Limitation of Actions," read-
ing as follows: 
"Where, although the cause of action itself has ac-
crued, some preliminary step is required before a re-
sort can be had to the remedy, the condition referring 
merely to the remedy and not to the right, the cause 
will be barred if not brought within the statutory 
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period; therefore the preliminary step must be taken 
within that period." * * * 
It will be noticed in the San Pete County case that the 
suit was brought within the statutory period of four years, 
and the court did not find that the "demand'' referred to in 
that decision, as being implied in Section 2642 Laws of 1907, 
now 80-10-17, Revised Statutes 1933 was the act giving rise 
to that action. 
And a demand which has no such basis cannot be the 
subject of a claim within the meaning of the law, even though 
allowed as such, although a demand may be made for certain 
administrative purposes, as referred to above, such a demand 
is not required before resort can be had to the remedy. 
The demand the court has read into this statute cannot 
in our opinion possibly be the act giving rise to the cause of 
action, and its presentation, if necessary, is but part of the 
procedure for administrative purposes, and to perfect the 
cause of action, and is not the act giving rise to the cause 
of action, from which alone the limitation of the statute must 
be measured. (See \Vhite v. King County, 174 Pac. 3) 
It was held in the case of Swing v. Barnard-Cope Mfg. 
Co., etc., 131 N.\V. Page 855, as follows: 
"* * * 1. Limitation of Actions-Accrual of Cause-
Conditions Precedent-Notice. \Vhere a condition pre-
cedent to the right to sue on a cause of action is not 
a part of the cause of action, but merely a part of or 
one step in the remedy, it does not delay the running 
of the statute of limitations." * * * 
Therefore, the Court holds that the Statute of Limita-
tions runs from the date of payment." * * * (End of quote.) 
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If a payment under protest is necessary to recover in 
these causes of action then surely the plaintiff must lose as 
to each and every one of them. But if payment under protest 
is not necessary then most certainly a demand is not necessary 
for the accrual of the cause of action, but only a preliminary 
step that is required before resort may be had to the remedy, 
the condition referring merely to the remedy and not to the 
right. People v. Cal. Safe Co., et al, 189 P 289, 37 CJ 955. 
See also: White v. King County (Wash.) 174 P. 3; Neal 
Young Bond Co. v. Mitchell County (C Tex app) 54 SW 284; 
Swing v. Barnard-Cope Mfg. Co. (Minn.) 131 NW 855; 
Baker v. Johnson County, 43 Iowa 645. 
We are definitely of the opinion that this court committed 
itself to the proposition that a demand is not necessary to the 
accrual of the cause of action a long time ago. Because in 
Auerbach v. Salt Lake County, 23 U 103, 63 P 907, there is 
the following headnote: 
"5. Claim against County: Presentment for Payment 
Before Suit Not Required. There being no statute in 
this State which expressly prohibits the bringing of an 
action on a claim against a county before a duly item-
ized and verified statement has been presented to the 
board of county commissioners, an objection that the 
complaint does not allege the presentation and rejec-
tion of such a claim, being raised for the first time in 
this court, can not avail the defendant; such an ob-
jection being simply in abatement of the action, to 
have effect, must be urged by proper plea, or in some 
other appropriate manner in the trial court, or it will 
be regarded as waived." 
We agree definitely with the lower court that this court 
did not consider that a demand was necessary for the accrual 
of the cause of action in the Neilson v. San Pete County case. 
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And we are forced to admit that we cannot see any similarity 
in the instant case and Espanda v. Ogden State Bank, 7 S U 
117. The statute that governs that case, Comp. Laws of Utah, 
1917, para. 6478, now R. S. U. 1933, 104-2-24, expressly says 
there is no limitation against recovery of Bank deposits. 
We now come to the case of State Tax Commission v. 
Spanish Fork-U-100 P 2nd 575, upon which the plaintiff 
so thoroughly relies. Again we must confess that we utterly 
fail in being able to follow the plaintiff's logic in maintaining 
that case is in their favor. To us, if it supports either side it 
is our side. Both cases are alike in this-they are founded 
upon a statutory liability. 
But they are distinguishable in this-that the Spanish 
Fork case was controlled by special statutes that made the 
accrual of the cause of action contingent upon a certain con-
dition. That condition was the filing of a report. And the 
statute expressly provides a way for the Tax Commission to 
file the report in case the vendor-taxpayer fails to do so. 
The Court held in the Spanish Fork case that it was the 
filing of the return that started the Statute to run, not the 
demand. The Court says: 
"To the contention that the Tax Commission by delay 
in filing a return for the Tax debtor when he failed to 
file one for himself, may thus postpone the running of 
the statute, the ready answer lies that the vendor-
taxpayer could have prevented such a result by filing 
the return." (Italics supplied.) 
The case definitely holds that the demand was merely a 
step in or a part of the remedy and not a part of the cause of 
action. Because the Court figured (Page 576, paragraphs 3 
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and 4) the time of starting the running of the statute from 
August 13, 1936, the time of filing the return, instead of Sep-
tember 18, 1936, the date of demand. 
Plaintiff's allusion to relief under 104-54-14, R. S. U. 
1933, takes one's mind into the realms of fantasy where logic 
and reason fade into oblivion as completely as the "Lost 
Tribes of Israel." 
Plaintiff's argument that he should be paid because of his 
bald statement that since Smith v. Carbon County, many coun-
ties have voluntarily paid like claims, is met with an equally 
bald statement, many counties have not, and may we note 
that the State of Utah has refused to return any money re-
ceived from inheritance taxes on Union Pacific stock which 
the U. S. Supreme Court held it had no right to collect, where 
demand was made for return more than one year after 
payment. 
The Court need not lean over to extend a helping hand 
to the plaintiff and others in a like position. It was the weal-
thy estates that paid the large fees. They employed the best 
counsel and paid liberal fees for their counsel, while the 
County officers were never picked because of their knowledge 
of the law. The officers had a right to assume that the Legis-
lature passed valid laws. 
We submit that neither the plaintiff nor any other person 
should be allowed to triumph over the Statute of Limitations 
either through his laches or his delict. We still are of the 
opinion that this being a liability created by statute that it 
is governed by the statute which required the tax to be paid 
under protest and suit should have been started on the defend-
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ant's cause of action within at least one year from the date 
of the payment. 
For the reasons set forth in our briefs we respectfully sub-
mit that the trial Court erred in overruling defendant's de-
murrers to plaintiff's first cause of action and rendering judg-
ment on that cause in favor of the plaintiff. \Ve believe that 
the plaintiff's first cause of action does not state facts sufficient 
to justify the relief granted. \Ve further maintain that the 
trial Court did not err in holding the plaintiff's second and 
third causes of action were barred by the Statute of Limita-
tions and we submit that this Court should reverse the lower 
Court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the first cause of 
action and should sustain the lower Court's judgment dismiss-
ing plaintiff's second and third causes of action and remand 
the case with instructions to take appropriate procedure in 
accordance therewith. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN A. HENDRICKS, 
GLENN W. ADAMS, 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
Weber County. 
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